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The Blanchard (1985) Model of Perpetual Youth

Authors
Affiliations
Johns Hopkins University
Econ-ARK
Johns Hopkins University
Econ-ARK

This section analyzes a way to relax the standard assumption of infinite

lifetimes in the Ramsey/Cass-Koopmans

growth model. The trick, introduced by

Blanchard Blanchard, 1985, is to assume that the economy

is populated by agents who face a constant probability of death.

Thus, an agent who has lived a thousand years is no more likely to die

in the next year than an agent who was born yesterday.

Time is measured continuously. If there is an instantaneous

probability d\pDies of dying, the probability (as viewed by a person

alive in period tt) of still being alive (not dead) in period

τ\tThen is

tτ=ed(τt).\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \Alive_{t}^{\tThen} & = e^{-\pDies(\tThen-t)} . \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
Solution to Exercise 1
>
> A consumer with a pure time preference rate of zero will downweight
>
> the utility he receives conditional on being alive by the probability
>
> that he is still alive, yielding a discounted utility of
>
> ```{math}
> \begin{gathered}\begin{aligned}
>         \int_{t}^{\infty} (\log c_{\tThen}) \Alive_{t}^{\tThen} e^{-\timeRate (\tThen-t)}d\tThen & =  \int_{t}^{\infty} (\log c_{\tThen}) e^{-\timeRate (\tThen-t)} e^{-\pDies (\tThen-t)} \nonumber d\tThen \\
>          & =    \int_{t}^{\infty} (\log c_{\tThen}) e^{-(\timeRate+\pDies) (\tThen-t)} d\tThen
> \\       & =    \int_{t}^{\infty} (\log c_{\tThen}) e^{-\hat{\timeRate} (\tThen-t)} d\tThen
> \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
> ```
>
> where {math}`\hat{\timeRate} = \timeRate+\pDies`.
>
> A similar point holds in the discrete time model. A sensible thing to
>
> assume is that if you have died before {math}`t+1`, you get zero utility in
>
> {math}`t+1` and after. Thus, in the two-period context, if the probability
>
> of death between {math}`T-1` and {math}`T` was zero we would have
>
> ```{math}
> V_{T-1} = \max \uFunc(C_{T-1}) + \left(\frac{1}{1+\timeRate}\right) \uFunc(C_{T})
> ```
>
> while if there is a probability {math}`\pDies` of dying between {math}`T` and {math}`T+1`
>
> value would be:
>
> ```{math}
> :label: eq:approx
>
> \begin{gathered}\begin{aligned}
>    V_{T-1} & =  \max \uFunc(C_{T-1}) + (1-\pDies)\left(\frac{1}{1+\timeRate}\right) \uFunc(C_{T}) + \pDies*\beta*0 \nonumber 
> \\   & =  \max \uFunc(C_{T-1}) + \left(\frac{1-\pDies}{1+\timeRate}\right) \uFunc(C_{T}) \nonumber
> \\   & \approx  \max \uFunc(C_{T-1}) + \left(\frac{1}{1+\timeRate+\pDies}\right) \uFunc(C_{T})  
> \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
> ```
>
> But behavior in this case is virtually indistinguishable from the
>
> behavior that would be induced if the consumer had a time preference
>
> rate of {math}`\timeRate+\pDies`. In continuous time, the approximation in
>
> {eq}`eq:approx` becomes exact.
If the probability of death is constant, the expected remaining life

for an agent of any age is given by

```{math}
\int_{0}^{\infty} \pDies \tau e^{-\pDies \tau}d\tau = \pDies^{-1}.
```

which we will call the agent’s ‘horizon.’ For example, if the chances

of dying per year are {math}`\pDies=1/50`, then the agent’s horizon is 50 years.

We will assume that at every instant of time, a large cohort, whose size

is normalized to be {math}`\pDies`, is born.
Solution to Exercise 2
>
> The aggregate population will be the sum of the still-alive persons
>
> from all past generations.
>
> The proportion of a population born at time {math}`s` that is still living
>
> at time {math}`\tThen` is {math}`\Alive_{s}^{\tThen}` by equation {eq}`eq:living`.
>
> Thus, the absolute size at time {math}`\tThen` of a cohort of size {math}`\pDies` born at
>
> time {math}`s` is {math}`\pDies \Alive_{s}^{\tThen} = \pDies e^{-\pDies (\tThen-s)}`. The economy’s
>
> total population will be the sum of the populations of all the cohorts
>
> that are currently living. Since the economy has existed forever,
>
> there will be remaining members of every cohort back to {math}`s=-\infty`.
>
> Thus, indexing each cohort by a time index {math}`s`, {eq}`eq:totpop` is
>
> simply the sum of the populations of all currently living members of
>
> every generation.
>
> Substituting the formula for {math}`\Alive`, the integral becomes
>
> ```{math}
> :label: eq:fmhint
>
> \begin{gathered}\begin{aligned}
>         P_{t} & =  \pDies \int_{-\infty}^{t} e^{-\pDies(t-s)} ds 
> \\        & =  \pDies \int_{t}^{\infty} e^{-\pDies(s-t)} ds 
> \\        & =  \pDies \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\pDies \tThen}d\tThen
> \\        & =  \pDies \pDies^{-1}  
> \\        & =  1 
> \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
> ```
>
> where the second line comes from a change of variables {math}`\tThen = s-t`
>
> and {eq}`eq:fmhint` follows from the hint.

Now some notation. We will define variable x(s,t)x(s,t) as the value at

date tt of the variable xx for a consumer who was born at date ss.

Thus, c(s,t)c(s,t) is consumption at tt of a consumer born at ss.

Suppose that the consumers in this economy do not have a bequest

motive. If they have positive assets at the instant when they die,

they are no happier than if they had zero assets. This means that if

someone were willing to pay them something while they are still alive

for the right to inherit their assets whenever they die, these consumers would

happily take that deal.

For a consumer with wealth w(s,t)w(s,t) who has probability of dying d\pDies,

the flow value of the right to inherit that wealth is dw(s,t)\pDies w(s,t). We

will therefore assume that insurance companies exist that pay a

consumer with wealth w(s,t)w(s,t) an amount dw(s,t)\pDies w(s,t) in exchange for the

right to receive that consumer’s wealth when he dies. (The insurance

company will make zero profits).

But notice that from the standpoint of the consumer, this is

equivalent to saying that the interest rate received on wealth is

higher by amount d\pDies.

Now suppose the marginal product of capital in this

perfectly-competitive economy is constant at r\rfree and suppose an agent

born in ss receives exogenous labor income in period tt of y(s,t)y(s,t).

This plus the insurance scheme implies that the agent’s dynamic budget

constraint is given by

w˙(s,t)=(r+d)w(s,t)+y(s,t)c(s,t).\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{w}(s,t) & = (\rfree+\pDies) w(s,t) + y(s,t)-c(s,t) . \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Define the ‘effective’ interest rate as viewed by a consumer as r^=r+d\hat{\rfree} = \rfree+\pDies.

Solution to Exercise 3
>
> The current-value Hamiltonian is written
>
> ```{math}
> \Ham(c,w,\lambda) = \log c(s,t) + \lambda(\hat{\rfree} w(s,t) + y(s,t) - c(s,t))
> ```
>
> so the first optimality condition {math}`\partial \Ham/\partial c(s,t) = 0` implies
>
> ```{math}
> \begin{gathered}\begin{aligned}
>         1/c(s,t) & =  \lambda
> \\  - \dot{c}(s,t)/c(s,t)^{2} & =  \dot{\lambda}       
> \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
> ```
>
> and the second optimization condtion implies
>
> ```{math}
> \begin{gathered}\begin{aligned}
>         \dot{\lambda} & =  \hat{\timeRate} \lambda - \partial \Ham/\partial w(s,t)  
> \\       & =  \hat{\timeRate} \lambda - \hat{\rfree} \lambda  
> \\      \left(\frac{\dot{\lambda}}{\lambda}\right) & =  \hat{\timeRate}-\hat{\rfree}
> \\  \left(\frac{-\dot{c}(s,t) c(s,t)}{c(s,t)^{2}}\right) & =  \hat{\timeRate}-\hat{\rfree}
> \\  \left(\frac{\dot{c}(s,t)}{c(s,t)}\right) & =  \hat{\rfree}-\hat{\timeRate} 
> \\   & =  \rfree-\timeRate     .
> \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
> ```

.
Solution to Exercise 4
>
> The IBC says that the PDV of consumption must equal wealth plus the PDV
>
> of future labor income:
>
> ```{math}
> \begin{gathered}\begin{aligned}
>         \int_{t}^{\infty} (c(s,\tThen)/\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{t}^{\tThen})  d\tThen & =  w(s,t) + \int_{t}^{\infty} y(\tThen,t)/\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{t}^{\tThen} d\tThen
> \\      \int_{t}^{\infty} (c(s,\tThen)/\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{t}^{\tThen}) d\tThen & =  w(s,t) + h(s,t).
> \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
> ```
>
> But if {math}`\dot{c}(s,t)/c(s,t) = \hat{\rfree}_{t}-\hat{\timeRate}` then
>
> ```{math}
> \begin{gathered}\begin{aligned}
>         c(s,\tThen) & =  c(s,t)e^{\int_{s}^{\tThen}\hat{\rfree}_\mu d\mu}e^{-\hat{\timeRate}(\tThen-t)}
> \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
> ```
>
> implying
>
> ```{math}
> \begin{gathered}\begin{aligned}
>         \int_{t}^{\infty} (c(s,\tThen)/\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{t}^{\tThen}) d\tThen & =  
> \int_{t}^{\infty} c(s,t) e^{\int_{s}^{\tThen}\hat{\rfree}_\mu  d\mu}e^{-\hat{\timeRate}(\tThen-t)}e^{-\int_{s}^{\tThen}\hat{\rfree}_\mu d\mu} d\tThen \nonumber
> \\         & =  c(s,t) \int_{t}^{\infty} e^{-\hat{\timeRate}(\tThen-t)} d\tThen
> \\   & =  c(s,t)/\hat{\timeRate}
> \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
> ```
>
> so that the IBC becomes:
>
> ```{math}
> \begin{gathered}\begin{aligned}
>         c(s,t)/\hat{\timeRate} & =  w(s,t)+h(s,t)  \\
>         c(s,t) & =  \hat{\timeRate} (w(s,t)+h(s,t)) .
> \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
> ```
Suppose we define upper-case variables as the aggregate value across all

generations currently living of the corresponding lower-case value, e.g.

aggregate consumption is

```{math}
\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned}
        C(t) & =  \int_{-\infty}^{t} \pDies c(\tThen,t) \Alive_{\tThen}^{t} d\tThen.
\end{aligned}\end{gathered}
```
Solution to Exercise 5
C(t)=tdc(τ,t)τtdτ=tdϑ^(w(τ,t)+h(τ,t))τtdτ=ϑ^(W(t)+H(t))\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} C(t) & = \int_{-\infty}^{t} \pDies c(\tThen,t) \Alive_{\tThen}^{t} d\tThen \\ & = \int_{-\infty}^{t} \pDies \hat{\timeRate}(w(\tThen,t)+h(\tThen,t)) \Alive_{\tThen}^{t} d\tThen \\ & = \hat{\timeRate} (W(t)+H(t)) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

from the definition of W(t)W(t) and H(t)H(t).

Suppose all living agents in this economy receive the same noncapital

income, y(s,t)=Y(t)y(s,t) = Y(t). Since every member of the population has the

same income, and the size of the population is one, aggregate income

will also be Y(t)Y(t). Aggregate human wealth at tt is therefore

H(t)=t(Y(τ)/R^tτ)dτ\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} H(t) & = \int_{t}^{\infty} (Y(\tThen)/\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{t}^{\tThen}) d\tThen \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

where

H˙(t)=r^tH(t)Y(t).\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{H}(t) & = \hat{\rfree}_{t} H(t) - Y(t) . \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

The differential equation for aggregate wealth can be

shown to be

W˙(t)=w(t,t)dW(t)+tw˙(τ,t)ded(tτ)dτ,\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{W}(t) & = w(t,t) - \pDies W(t) + \int_{-\infty}^{t} \dot{w}(\tThen,t) \pDies e^{-\pDies(t-\tThen)} d\tThen, \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

where w(t,t)=0w(t,t)=0 is the wealth of newly born generations, dW(t)\pDies W(t) is

the wealth of those who are dying at the moment, and the last term is

the change in wealth for those who neither die nor are born in this

period. But (2) implies that

tw˙(τ,t)ded(tτ)dτ=(r+d)W(t)+Y(t)C(t)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \int_{-\infty}^{t} \dot{w}(\tThen,t) \pDies e^{-\pDies(t-\tThen)} d\tThen & = (\rfree+\pDies) W(t) + Y(t)-C(t) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

so (6) becomes

W˙(t)=rW(t)+Y(t)C(t).\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{W}(t) & = \rfree W(t) + Y(t)-C(t). \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Collecting, writing out r^=r+d\hat{\rfree}=\rfree+\pDies and ϑ^=ϑ+d\hat{\timeRate}=\timeRate+\pDies, and

dropping the (t)(t) arguments gives us the following equations for

aggregate variables:

C=(d+ϑ)(H+W)H˙=(r+d)HYW˙=rW+YC\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} C & = (\pDies+\timeRate) (H+W) \\ \dot{H} & = (\rfree+\pDies) H - Y \\ \dot{W} & = \rfree W + Y - C % \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Use these equations to show that in this economy

C˙=(rϑ)Cd(d+ϑ)W\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{C} & = (\rfree-\timeRate) C - \pDies(\pDies+\timeRate) W \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Hint: Differentiate (9) and substitute out for HH by solving

(9) for HH.

Answer:

Time differentiate (9) and substitute for H˙\dot{H},

W˙\dot{W}, and HH to get

C˙=(d+ϑ)[(r+d)HY+rW+YC]=(d+ϑ)[(r+d)H+rW]C(d+ϑ)=(d+ϑ)[(r+d)(Cd+ϑW)+rW]C(d+ϑ)=(r+d)C+(d+ϑ)[rW(r+d)W]C(d+ϑ)=(rϑ)C(d+ϑ)dW.\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{C} & = (\pDies+\timeRate)\left[(\rfree+\pDies) H - Y + \rfree W + Y - C\right] \\ & = (\pDies+\timeRate)\left[(\rfree+\pDies) H + \rfree W \right] - C (\pDies+\timeRate) \\ & = (\pDies+\timeRate)\left[(\rfree+\pDies) \left(\frac{C}{\pDies+\timeRate}-W\right)+r W\right] - C (\pDies+\timeRate) \\ & = (\rfree+\pDies) C + (\pDies+\timeRate)\left[ rW - (\rfree+\pDies) W \right] - C(\pDies+\timeRate) \\ & = (\rfree-\timeRate) C - (\pDies+\timeRate)\pDies W. \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Now assume there is a standard production function

F(K)=KαδK\FFunc(K)=K^{\alpha}-\delta K and assume perfect competition so that the

net interest rate rr is equal to the net marginal product of capital,

r=F(K)=αKα1δ\rfree = \FFunc^{\prime}(K) = \alpha K^{\alpha-1}-\delta

and the aggregate capital stock at time tt is the same as aggregate

nonhuman wealth, K(t)=W(t)K(t)=W(t). The aggregate accumulation equation is

just the usual

K˙=KαδKC.\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{K} & = K^{\alpha}-\delta K -C. \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
Solution to Exercise 7

Answer:

Using (13), the K˙=0\dot{K}=0 locus is

C=KαδK\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} C & = K^{\alpha}-\delta K \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

which yields the usual hump-shaped K˙=0\dot{K}=0 locus.

Rewriting the C˙\dot{C} equation as a function of KK yields

C˙=(αKα1ϑδ)C(d+ϑ)dK.\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{C} & = (\alpha K^{\alpha-1} - \timeRate - \delta)C - (\pDies+\timeRate)\pDies K. \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

The C˙=0\dot{C}=0 locus is therefore given by

0=(αKα1ϑδ)d(d+ϑ)K/Cd(d+ϑ)K/C=(αKα1δϑ)d(d+ϑ)K=C(αKα1δϑ)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} 0 & = (\alpha K^{\alpha-1}-\timeRate-\delta) - \pDies(\pDies+\timeRate) K/C \\ \pDies(\pDies+\timeRate) K/C & = (\alpha K^{\alpha-1}-\delta-\timeRate) \\ \pDies(\pDies+\timeRate) K & = C(\alpha K^{\alpha-1}-\delta-\timeRate) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

In the limit as C0C \rightarrow 0 this expression approaches

d(d+ϑ)K=0\pDies(\pDies+\timeRate) K = 0

which can be true only if lim{C0}K=0\lim_{\{C \rightarrow 0\}} K = 0.

On the other hand, as CC \rightarrow \infty we know that KK

must remain finite (because the DBC does not allow infinite

accumulation of KK), which means that

lim{C}αKα1=(ϑ+δ)K=((ϑ+δ)/α)1/(α1).\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \lim_{\{C \rightarrow \infty\}} \alpha K^{\alpha-1} & = (\timeRate+\delta) \\ K^{*} & = ((\timeRate+\delta)/\alpha)^{1/{(\alpha-1)}}. \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

In the infinite horizon economy we have d=0\pDies = 0 and so the

steady-state interest rate would be the KK^{*} where α>Kα1δ=ϑ\alpha > K^{\alpha-1}-\delta = \timeRate. But since K/CK/C and d(d+ϑ)\pDies(\pDies+\timeRate) are

strictly positive, in this finite-horizon economy we would have

C˙/C<0\dot{C}/C < 0 at K=KK=K^{*}. It is clear therefore that in order

for (17) to hold we will need αKα1\alpha K^{\alpha-1}

to be larger than it is at KK^{*}, which is to say we need a higher

steady-state interest rate, and thus we need a lower steady-state

capital stock, which is depicted in the figure as Kˉ\bar{K}.

This makes sense because the finite-horizon consumers in this economy

discount the future more than the representative agent does, because

they die but a representative agent does not.

These results are combined in the figure, which shows that the intersection

of the C˙=0\dot{C}=0 locus intersects the K˙=0\dot{K}=0 locus at point AA

which corresponds to a lower level of the capital stock than in the

infinite horizon model.

Now consider the introduction of a government that finances spending

either by lump-sum taxes or by debt. Its dynamic budget constraint is

D˙=rD+GT\dot{D} = \rfree D + G - \TaxLev

where DD is government debt, GG is government spending, and

T\TaxLev is a lump-sum per capita tax. Defining

Rts=etsrvdv\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \mathcal{R}_t^{s} = e^{\int_t^{s}\rfree_v dv} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

as the compound interest factor between time tt and time ss, the

government is also required to satisfy the transversality condition

limtDt/Rts=0.\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} D_t/\mathcal{R}_t^{s} = 0.

Consider the following fiscal policy experiment. Until time tt there

has been no government (Gs=Ds=Ts=0  s<tG_s = D_s = \TaxLev_s=0~\forall~s<t). At date

tt the government issues a quantity DD of debt and announces that

future lump sum taxes will be imposed in amounts exactly large enough

to pay the interest on this debt (so subsequently, D˙=0\dot{D}=0

forever). The government rebates the proceeds of its sale of debt to

the public as a per-capita lump sum of DD per person. The government

will never engage in any spending (aside from paying interest on the

debt). Define the new variables

W=K+DY=YTH=tY/R^tsds\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \mathcal{W} & = K + D \\ \mathcal{Y} & = Y - \TaxLev \\ \mathcal{H} & = \int_{t}^{\infty} \mathcal{Y}/\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{t}^{s} ds \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
Solution to Exercise 8

Answer:

The effect of the government policy is twofold. On the one hand,

the distribution of government bonds increases the consumers’

wealth WW by an amount equal to the value of the bonds received,

resulting in a new definition of wealth W\mathcal{W} which

includes the bonds. On the other hand, the higher value of taxes

off to infinity reduces the consumers’ human wealth by an amount

equal to the present discounted value of the taxes.

The change in (redefined) wealth is now net income YϑY-\timeRate

minus consumption.

Solution to Exercise 9

Answer:

Time differentiating (29) yields

C˙=(d+ϑ)(H˙+W˙)=(d+ϑ)(rW+(r+d)HC)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{C} & = (\pDies+\timeRate) (\dot{\mathcal{H}} + \dot{\mathcal{W}}) \\ & = (\pDies+\timeRate)(\rfree \mathcal{W}+(\rfree+\pDies)\mathcal{H}-C) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Now solve (29) for H\mathcal{H},

H=(Cd+ϑ)W\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \mathcal{H} & = \left(\frac{C}{\pDies+ \timeRate}\right)-\mathcal{W} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

and substitute into (31) to obtain

C˙=(d+ϑ)(rW+(r+d)(C(d+ϑ)1W)C)=(r+d)C(d+ϑ)Cd(d+ϑ)W=(rϑ)Cd(d+ϑ)(K+D).\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{C} & = (\pDies+\timeRate)(\rfree \mathcal{W}+(\rfree+\pDies)(C(\pDies+\timeRate)^{-1} - \mathcal{W})-C) \\ & = (\rfree+\pDies)C - (\pDies+\timeRate)C- \pDies(\pDies+\timeRate)\mathcal{W} \\ & = (\rfree-\timeRate)C - \pDies(\pDies+\timeRate)(K+D). \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Since we are assuming that DD is a constant (after the fiscal

experiment), any combination of CC and WW that would have been on

the C˙=0\dot{C}=0 locus before the policy shift now has a value C˙=d(d+ϑ)D\dot{C} = -\pDies(\pDies+\timeRate)D. This means that the CC that would restore

C˙=0\dot{C}=0 must be a larger CC, which says that the C˙=0\dot{C}=0

locus shifts up (or, equivalently, to the left). Thus, the new

equilibrium will be at a lower value of KK and a higher interest

rate.

The phase diagram shows that the new equilibrium point AA' is to the left

of the original equilibrium. This is because at a given level of the aggregate

capital stock, consumers spend more because W>W\mathcal{W}>W. Thus,

Ricardian equivalence does not hold in this model, because a tax cut today

financed by a future perpetual tax is a transfer of resources from future

consumers to today’s consumers, and there are no altruistic links that

make current consumers offset this by saving more on behalf of future

generations.

The next figure shows the path of consumption per capita in this

economy. Prior to time 0, the economy was in its steady-state

equilibrium at the level of consumption C0C_0 corresponding to the

equilibrium labeled AA in the phase diagram. At time 0, the fiscal

policy is carried out. The fiscal policy immediately increases

consumption because it amounts to a transfer of resources from future

to current generations. However, the higher level of consumption runs

down the capital stock per capita, and so over time consumption asypmtotically

approaches a new, lower equilibrium level of consumption CC'.

Blanchard shows that if the model is changed so that each

consumer’s income declines exponentially at rate γ\gamma after

birth, the result is equivalent to assuming that future labor income

is discounted at an interest rate that is higher by γ\gamma. He

further shows that the equations of motion of the model change to

C˙=(αKα1δ+γϑ)C(d+γ)(d+ϑ)KK˙=KαδKC.\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \dot{C} & = (\alpha K^{\alpha-1}-\delta +\gamma-\timeRate)C-(\pDies+\gamma)(\pDies+\timeRate)K \\ \dot{K} & = K^{\alpha}-\delta K - C. % \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Note that it is possible to rewrite the C˙=0\dot{C}=0 locus as

(αKα1δ+γϑ)C=(d+γ)(d+ϑ)K\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} (\alpha K^{\alpha-1}-\delta +\gamma-\timeRate)C & = (\pDies+\gamma)(\pDies+\timeRate)K \end{aligned}\end{gathered}
Solution to Exercise 10

Answer:

As CC goes to infinity on the LHS of (35), the only way

the equation can continue to hold is if

limC(αKα1δ+γϑ)=0\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \lim_{C \rightarrow \infty} (\alpha K^{\alpha-1}-\delta +\gamma-\timeRate) & = 0 \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

which implies (36).

The new phase diagram shows the C˙=0\dot{C}=0 locus intersecting the

K˙=0\dot{K}=0 locus to the right of the maximum of the K˙=0\dot{K}=0 locus.

This is implied by the fact that the net interest rate is negative, which

means that the net interest rate could be increased by reducing

the capital stock.

The reason this is an interesting case is that in this case it is

possible for the economy to be in a condition of dynamic inefficiency,

just as in the 2-period OLG models discussed early in the class. The idea

is to think of declining labor income as a way to generate a ‘life cycle’

saving motive. In such a case the fiscal experiment examined above

is interesting because it could rescue an economy with too much capital

from a state of dynamic inefficiency.

References
  1. Blanchard, O. J. (1985). Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons. Journal of Political Economy, 93(2), 223–247. 10.1086/261297