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Consumption out of Risky Assets

Authors
Affiliations
Johns Hopkins University
Econ-ARK
Johns Hopkins University
Econ-ARK

Consider a consumer with CRRA utility whose only available financial asset has a risky return factor Rˊ\RiskyAlt which is lognormally distributed, logRˊt+1N(rˊσr2/2,σr2)\log \RiskyAlt_{t+1} \sim \mathcal{N}({\riskyAlt} - \sigma_{\risky}^{2}/2,\sigma_{\risky}^{2}).

With market assets m\mRat, the dynamic budget constraint is:

mt+1=(mtct)Rˊt+1.{m}_{t+1} = ({m}_{t}-c_{t})\RiskyAlt_{t+1}.

Start with the standard Euler equation for consumption under CRRA utility:

1=βEt[Rˊt+1(ct+1ct)ρ]1 = \Discount \Ex_{t}\left[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}\left(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_{t}}\right)^{-\CRRA}\right]

and postulate a solution of the form ct=κmtc_{t} = \MPC {m}_{t}. The guess-and-verify method works here because market resources mtm_t appear in both numerator and denominator, allowing them to cancel; if labor income appeared in the numerator, this approach would fail.

1=βEt[Rˊt+1(κmt+1κmt)ρ]=βEt[Rˊt+1((mtct)Rˊt+1mt)ρ]=βEt[Rˊt+1((1κ)mtRˊt+1mt)ρ]=βEt[Rˊt+1((1κ)Rˊt+1)ρ]=β(1κ)ρEt[Rˊt+11ρ](1κ)ρ=βEt[Rˊt+11ρ](1κ)=(βEt[Rˊt+11ρ])1/ρκ=1(βEt[Rˊt+11ρ])1/ρ\begin{aligned} 1 & = \Discount \Ex_{t}\left[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}\left(\frac{\MPC {m}_{t+1}}{\MPC {m}_{t}}\right)^{-\CRRA}\right] \\ & = \Discount \Ex_{t}\left[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}\left(\frac{({m}_{t}-c_{t})\RiskyAlt_{t+1}}{ {m}_{t}}\right)^{-\CRRA}\right] \\ & = \Discount \Ex_{t}\left[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}\left(\frac{(1-\MPC){m}_{t}\RiskyAlt_{t+1}}{ {m}_{t}}\right)^{-\CRRA}\right] \\ & = \Discount \Ex_{t}\left[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}\left((1-\MPC)\RiskyAlt_{t+1}\right)^{-\CRRA}\right] \\ & = \Discount (1-\MPC)^{-\CRRA}\Ex_{t}\left[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}^{1-\CRRA}\right] \\ (1-\MPC)^{\CRRA} & = \Discount \Ex_{t}[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}^{1-\CRRA}] \\ (1-\MPC) & = \left(\Discount \Ex_{t}[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}^{1-\CRRA}]\right)^{1/\CRRA} \\ \MPC & = 1- \left(\Discount \Ex_{t}[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}^{1-\CRRA}]\right)^{1/\CRRA} \end{aligned}

which (finally) yields an exact formula for κ\MPC:

κ=1(βEt[Rˊt+11ρ])1/ρ.\MPC = 1- \left(\Discount \Ex_{t}[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}^{1-\CRRA}]\right)^{1/\CRRA}.

Since logRˊt+11ρ=(1ρ)logRˊt+1\log \RiskyAlt_{t+1}^{1-\CRRA} = (1-\CRRA) \log \RiskyAlt_{t+1}, fact ELogNormTimes implies that (using the definition exp()e\exp(\bullet) \equiv e^{\bullet}),

Et[Rˊt+11ρ]=exp[(1ρ)(rˊσr2/2)+(1ρ)2σr2/2]=exp[(1ρ)rˊ(1ρ)(σr2/2)+(1ρ)(σr2/2)ρ(1ρ)σr2/2]=exp[(1ρ)rˊρ(1ρ)σr2/2].\begin{aligned} \Ex_{t}[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}^{1-\CRRA}] & = \exp[(1-\CRRA) ({\riskyAlt} -\sigma_{\risky}^{2}/2)+ (1-\CRRA)^{2} \sigma_{\risky}^{2} /2] \\ & = \exp[(1-\CRRA) {\riskyAlt} -(1-\CRRA)(\sigma_{\risky}^{2}/2) + (1-\CRRA)(\sigma^{2}_{\risky}/2) - \CRRA(1-\CRRA)\sigma_{\risky}^{2}/2] \\ & = \exp[(1-\CRRA) {\riskyAlt} - \CRRA(1-\CRRA)\sigma_{\risky}^{2}/2]. \end{aligned}

Substituting in (4):

κ=1β1/ρexp[ρ((1/ρ1)rˊ(1ρ)σr2/2)]1/ρ=1β1/ρexp[(1/ρ1)rˊ(1ρ)σr2/2].\begin{aligned} \MPC & = 1- \Discount ^{1/\CRRA} \exp\left[\CRRA\left((1/\CRRA - 1){\riskyAlt} - (1-\CRRA)\sigma_{\risky}^{2}/2\right)\right]^{1/\CRRA} \\ & = 1- \Discount ^{1/\CRRA} \exp\left[(1/\CRRA - 1){\riskyAlt} - (1-\CRRA)\sigma_{\risky}^{2}/2\right]. \end{aligned}

Now use OverPlus and TaylorOne,

β1/ρ=(11+ϑ)1/ρ1ρ1ϑexp(ρ1ϑ)\begin{aligned} \Discount^{1/\CRRA} & = \left(\frac{1}{1+\DiscRate}\right)^{1/\CRRA} \\ & \approx 1-\CRRA^{-1}\DiscRate \\ & \approx \exp(-\CRRA^{-1}\DiscRate) \end{aligned}

which hold if ρ1ϑ\CRRA^{-1}\DiscRate is close to zero. Substituting into (6) and using ExpPlus and LogEps gives

κ1(1+ρ1(rˊϑ)rˊ+(ρ1)σr2/2)=rˊρ1(rˊϑ)(ρ1)(σr2/2)\begin{aligned} \MPC & \approx 1-(1+\CRRA^{-1}({\riskyAlt}-\DiscRate)-{\riskyAlt}+(\CRRA-1)\sigma_{\risky}^{2}/2) \\ & = {\riskyAlt}-\CRRA^{-1}({\riskyAlt}-\DiscRate) - \left(\CRRA-1\right)(\sigma_{\risky}^{2}/2) \end{aligned}

which, when σr2=0\sigma^{2}_{\risky}=0, reduces to the usual perfect foresight formula κ=rˊρ1(rˊϑ)\MPC = \riskyAlt - \CRRA^{-1}(\riskyAlt - \DiscRate).

This equation implies the plausible result that as unavoidable uncertainty in the financial return goes up (σr2\sigma_{\risky}^{2} rises) the level of consumption falls (because ρ>1\CRRA>1, so (ρ1)-(\CRRA-1) which multiplies σr2\sigma_{\risky}^{2} is negative). The reduction in consumption as risk increases reflects the precautionary saving motive.[1]

The top figure plots the marginal propensity to consume as a function of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (for both the true MPC and the approximation derived above), under parameter values such that ϑrˊ0\DiscRate - \riskyAlt \approx 0 so that a change in ρ\CRRA does not affect the MPC through the intertemporal elasticity of substitution channel. As intuition would suggest, as consumers become more risk averse, they save more (the MPC is lower; that is, the plotted loci are downward-sloping).

The other way to see the precautionary effect is to examine the effect on the MPC of a change in risk. For a consumer with relative risk aversion of 3, the bottom figure shows that as the size of the risk increases, the MPC κ\MPC falls.

1Relation Between MPC and Parameters

Marginal Propensity to Consume Falls as Relative Risk Aversion \CRRA Rises

Figure 1:Marginal Propensity to Consume Falls as Relative Risk Aversion ρ\CRRA Rises

Marginal Propensity to Consume Falls as Risk \sigma Rises

Figure 2:Marginal Propensity to Consume Falls as Risk σ\sigma Rises

Footnotes
  1. It is surprising to note that for a consumer with logarithmic utility, a mean-preserving spread in risk has no effect on the level of consumption (this can be seen by substituting ρ=1\CRRA=1 into (8), which causes the term involving risk σr2\sigma^{2}_{\risky} to disappear from the equation). The reason this is surprising is that intuition suggests that if the consumer’s consumption (and therefore current saving) are unchanged, the increase in uncertainty must constitute a mean-preserving spread in future consumption, which by Jensen’s inequality should yield higher expected marginal utility. The place where this argument goes wrong is that it forgets that the expectation in the Euler equation u(ct)=βEt[Rˊt+1u(ct+1)]\uFunc^{\prime}(c_{t})=\Discount \Ex_{t}[\RiskyAlt_{t+1} \uFunc^{\prime}(c_{t+1})] is also affected by a covariance between Rˊt+1\RiskyAlt_{t+1} and u(ct+1)\uFunc^{\prime}(c_{t+1}); the case of log utility is the special case where this boils down to a constant times Et[Rˊt+1/Rˊt+1]=1\Ex_{t}[\RiskyAlt_{t+1}/\RiskyAlt_{t+1}]= 1, which is why the expected marginal utility is unaffected by the unavoidable increase in risk. This is yet another reason (if any more were needed) to conclude that logarithmic utility does not exhibit sufficient curvature to plausibly represent attitudes toward risk. (ρ2\CRRA \geq 2 seems a plausible lower bound).