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An Entrepreneur’s Problem Under Perfect Foresight

Authors
Affiliations
Johns Hopkins University
Econ-ARK
Johns Hopkins University
Econ-ARK

Consider a firm characterized by the following:

SymbolDescription
kt\kap_{t}Firm’s capital stock at the beginning of period tt
f(k)\fFunc(\kap)The firm’s total output depends only on kk
it\inv_{t}Investment in period tt
j(i,k)\jFunc(i,k)Adjustment costs associated with investment i\inv given capital kk
ξt=it+jt\xpend_{t} = \inv_{t}+\adj_{t}Expenditures (purchases plus adjustment costs) on investment
β=1/R\Discount=1/\RfreeDiscount factor for future profits (inverse of interest factor)

With taxes:[1]

Suppose that the firm’s goal is to pick the sequence it\iFunc_{t} that solves:

e(kt)=max{i}t n=0βn(ft+nit+njt+n)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vFirm(\kap_{t}) & = \max_{\{\iFunc\}_{t}^{\infty}}~\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \Discount^{n} \left(f_{t+n}-\inv_{t+n}-\adj_{t+n}\right) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

With taxes: e(kt)=max{i}t n=0βn(πt+nξt+n)\vFirm(\kap_{t}) = \max_{\{\iFunc\}_{t}^{\infty}}~\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \Discount^{n} \left(\rev_{t+n}-\xpend_{t+n}\right)

subject to the transition equation for capital,

kt+1=(kt+it)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \kap_{t+1} & = (\kap_{t}+\inv_{t})\DeprFac \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

where =(1δ)\DeprFac = (1-\depr) is the amount of capital left after one period of depreciation at rate δ\depr.[2] et\vFirm_{t} is the value of the profit-maximizing firm: If capital markets are efficient this is the equity value that the firm would command if somebody wanted to buy it.

Solution to Exercise 1

The firm’s Bellman equation can be written:

et(kt)=max{i}t n=0βn(ft+nit+njt+n)=max{it} ftitj(it,kt)+β[max{i}t+1n=0βn(ft+1+nit+1+njt+1+n)]=max{it} ftitj(it,kt)+βet+1((kt+it))\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vFirm_{t}(\kap_{t}) & = \max_{\{\iFunc\}_{t}^{\infty}}~\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \Discount^{n} \left(f_{t+n}-\inv_{t+n}-\adj_{t+n}\right) \\ & = \max_{\{\inv_{t}\}}~ f_{t}-\inv_{t}-\jFunc(\inv_{t},\kap_{t})+\Discount \left[\max_{\{i\}_{t+1}^{\infty}}\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \Discount^{n} \left(f_{t+1+n}-\inv_{t+1+n}-\adj_{t+1+n}\right)\right] \\ & = \max_{\{\inv_{t}\}}~ f_{t}-\inv_{t}-\jFunc(\inv_{t},\kap_{t})+\Discount \vFirm_{t+1}\left((\kap_{t}+\inv_{t})\DeprFac\right) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Define jti\adj_{t}^{\inv} as the derivative of adjustment costs with respect to the level of investment.

Solution to Exercise 2

The first order condition for optimal investment implies:

0=1jti+βet+1k(kt+1)1+jti=βet+1k(kt+1)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} 0 & = -1 -j^{\inv}_{t} + \DeprFac\Discount \vFirm_{t+1}^{\kap}(\kap_{t+1}) \\ 1+j^{\inv}_{t} & = \DeprFac\Discount \vFirm_{t+1}^{\kap}(\kap_{t+1}) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

In words: The marginal cost of an additional unit of investment (the LHS) should be equal to the discounted marginal value of the resulting extra capital (the RHS).

With taxes: (1+jti)P=βet+1k(kt+1)(1+j^{\inv}_{t})\kPriceAfterITC = \DeprFac\Discount \vFirm_{t+1}^{\kap}(\kap_{t+1}), where the LHS is the after-tax marginal cost of investment.

Solution to Exercise 3

The Envelope theorem says

etk(kt)=fk(kt)jtk+βet+1k(kt+1)(kt+1kt)=fk(kt)jtk+βet+1k(kt+1)=(1+jti)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vFirm_{t}^{\kap}(\kap_{t}) & = \fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t}) - \adj_{t}^{\kap}+\Discount \vFirm_{t+1}^{\kap}(\kap_{t+1})\overbrace{\left(\frac{\partial \kap_{t+1}}{\partial \kap_{t}}\right)}^{\DeprFac} \\ & = \fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t}) - \adj_{t}^{\kap}+\underbrace{\Discount \DeprFac \vFirm_{t+1}^{\kap}(\kap_{t+1})}_{=(1+\adj_{t}^{\inv})} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

where the underbraced term follows from (6). So the corresponding t+1t+1 equation can be substituted into (6) to obtain

(1+jti)=(fk(kt+1)+(1+jt+1ijt+1k))β\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} (1+\adj_{t}^{\inv}) & = \left( \fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t+1})+(1+\adj_{t+1}^{\inv}-\adj_{t+1}^{\kap})\right)\DeprFac\Discount \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

which is the Euler equation for investment.

With taxes: (1+jti)P=β[τfk(kt+1)+(1+jt+1ijt+1k)P](1+\adj_{t}^{\inv})\kPriceAfterITC = \DeprFac\Discount \left[ \TaxFree\fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t+1})+(1+\adj_{t+1}^{\inv}-\adj_{t+1}^{\kap})\kPriceAfterITC\right]

1Steady State

Now suppose that a steady state exists in which the capital stock is at its optimal level and is not adjusting, so costs of adjustment are zero: jt=jt+1=jti=jt+1i=jtk=jt+1k=0\adj_{t}=\adj_{t+1}=j^{\inv}_{t}=j^{\inv}_{t+1}=j^{\kap}_{t}=j^{\kap}_{t+1}=0.

Solution to Exercise 4

If jti=jt+1i=jt+1kj^{\inv}_{t} = j^{\inv}_{t+1} = j^{\kap}_{t+1} then (9) reduces to

1=β=R1[fk(kˇ)+1]R=(1+fk(kˇ))\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} 1 & = \overbrace{\Discount}^{=\Rfree^{-1}} \DeprFac\left[\fFunc^{\kap}(\check{k})+1\right] \\ \Rfree & = \DeprFac (1+\fFunc^{\kap}(\check{k})) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

so that the capital stock is equal to the value that causes its marginal product to match the interest factor, after compensating for depreciation.

With taxes: PR=(P+τfk(kˇ))\kPriceAfterITC\Rfree = \DeprFac (\kPriceAfterITC+\TaxFree\fFunc^{\kap}(\check{k})), so the capital stock equals the value that causes its after-tax marginal product to match the interest factor.

2Phase Diagram Analysis

Another way to analyze this problem is in terms of the marginal value of capital, λtetk(kt)\ek_{t} \equiv \vFirm_{t}^{\kap}(\kap_{t}).

Solution to Exercise 5

Rewrite (8) as

λt=fk(kt)jtk+β(λt+λt+1λt)=fk(kt)jtk+β(λt+Δλt+1)(1β)λt=fk(kt)jtk+Δλt+1λt=fk(kt)jtk+Δλt+1(1β)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \ek_{t} & = \fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t}) - \adj_{t}^{\kap}+\Discount \DeprFac (\ek_{t}+\ek_{t+1}-\ek_{t}) \\ & = \fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t}) - \adj_{t}^{\kap}+\Discount \DeprFac (\ek_{t}+\Delta \ek_{t+1}) \\ (1-\Discount\DeprFac) \ek_{t} & = \fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t}) - \adj_{t}^{\kap}+\Delta \ek_{t+1} \\ \ek_{t} & = \frac{\fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t}) - \adj_{t}^{\kap}+\Delta \ek_{t+1}}{(1-\Discount\DeprFac)} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

and the phase diagram is constructed using the Δλt+1=0\Delta \ek_{t+1} = 0 locus. In the vicinity of the steady state, we can assume jtk0\adj_{t}^{\kap} \approx 0 in which case the Δλt+1=0\Delta \ek_{t+1}=0 locus becomes

λt=fk(kt)(1β)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \ek_{t} & = \frac{\fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t})}{(1-\Discount\DeprFac)} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

which implies (since fk(kt)\fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t}) is downward sloping in kt\kap_{t}) that the Δλt=0\Delta \ek_{t}=0 locus (that is, the λt(kt)\lambda_{t}(\kap_{t}) function that corresponds to Δλt=0\Delta \ek_{t}=0) is downward sloping.

The phase diagram is depicted in Figure 1.

Phase diagram showing the \Delta \ek=0 and \Delta \kap=0 loci.

Figure 1:Phase diagram showing the Δλ=0\Delta \ek=0 and Δk=0\Delta \kap=0 loci.

The steady state of the model will be the point at which kt+1=kt=kˇ\kap_{t+1}=\kap_{t}=\check{\kap}, implying from (2) a steady-state investment rate of

kˇ=(kˇ+iˇ)iˇ=(1)kˇ/=(δ/)kˇ\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \check{\kap} & = (\check{\kap}+\check{i})\DeprFac \\ \check{i} & = (1-\DeprFac)\check{\kap}/\DeprFac = (\depr/\DeprFac) \check{\kap} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

and solving (11) for fk(kˇ)\fFunc^{\kap}(\check{k})

((1β)β)=fk(kˇ)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{(1 - \Discount\DeprFac)}{\Discount \DeprFac}\right) & = \fFunc^{\kap}(\check{k}) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

which can be substituted into (14) to obtain the steady-state value of λ\ek:

λˇ=(R).\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \check{\ek} & = \left(\frac{\Rfree}{\DeprFac}\right) . \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

3The Entrepreneur’s Problem

We now wish to modify the problem in two ways. First, we have been assuming that the firm has only physical capital, and no financial assets. Second, we have been assuming that the manager running the firm only cares about the PDV of profits; suppose instead we want to assume that the firm is a small business run by an entrepreneur who must live off the dividends of the firm, and thus they are maximizing the discounted sum of utility from dividends u(ct)\utilFunc(\cRat_t) rather than just the level of discounted profits. (Note that we designate dividends by ct\cRat_{t}; dividends were not explicitly chosen in the q\q-model version of the problem, because the Modigliani-Miller theorem says that the firm’s value is unaffected by its dividend policy).

We call the maximizer running this firm the “entrepreneur.” The entrepreneur’s level of monetary assets mtm_{t} evolves according to

mt+1=ft+1+(mtitjtct)R.\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} m_{t+1} & = f_{t+1}+\left(m_{t}-\inv_{t}-\adj_{t}-\cRat_{t}\right)\Rfree. \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

That is, next period the firm’s money is next period’s profits plus the return factor on the money at the beginning of this period, minus this period’s investment and associated adjustment costs, minus dividends paid out (which, having been paid out, are no longer part of the firm’s money).

With taxes: mt+1=πt+1+(mtξtct)Rm_{t+1} = \rev_{t+1}+\left(m_{t}-\xpend_{t}-\cRat_{t}\right)\Rfree

Solution to Exercise 6

The entrepreneur’s Bellman equation can now be written

vt(kt,mt)=max{it,ct}  u(ct)+βvt+1(kt+1,mt+1)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vFunc_{t}(\kap_{t},m_{t}) & = \max_{\{\inv_{t},\cRat_{t}\}}~~\utilFunc(\cRat_{t}) +\Discount \vFunc_{t+1}(\kap_{t+1},m_{t+1}) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Derivation: Value is simply the discounted sum of utility from future dividends:

vt(kt,mt)=max{i,c}tn=0βnu(ct+n)=max{i,c}t(u(ct)+βn=0βnu(ct+1+n))=max{it,ct}  u(ct)+βvt+1(kt+1,mt+1).\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vFunc_{t}(\kap_{t},m_{t}) & = \max_{\{i,c\}_{t}^{\infty}} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \Discount^{n} \utilFunc(\cRat_{t+n}) \\ & = \max_{\{i,c\}_{t}^{\infty}} \left(\utilFunc(\cRat_{t})+\Discount\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \Discount^{n} \utilFunc(\cRat_{t+1+n})\right) \\ & = \max_{\{\inv_{t},\cRat_{t}\}}~~\utilFunc(\cRat_{t})+\Discount \vFunc_{t+1}(\kap_{t+1},m_{t+1}). \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Assume that f\fFunc and j\jFunc do not depend directly on mtm_{t}. That is, their partial derivatives with respect to mtm_{t} are zero.

4Euler Equation for Dividends

Solution to Exercise 7

Then we will have

FOC wrt ct\cRat_{t}:

u(ct)=Rβvt+1m\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \uP(\cRat_{t}) & = \Rfree\Discount \vNum^{m}_{t+1} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Envelope wrt mtm_{t}:

vtm=Rβvt+1m\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vNum_{t}^{m} & = \Rfree\Discount \vNum_{t+1}^{m} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

and combining the FOC with the Envelope theorem we get the usual

vtm=Rβvt+1m=u(ct)=Rβu(ct+1)=u(ct+1)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vNum^{m}_{t} & = \Rfree \Discount \vNum^{m}_{t+1} \\ & = \uP(\cRat_{t}) \\ & = \Rfree\Discount \uP(\cRat_{t+1}) \\ & = \uP(\cRat_{t+1}) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

where the last line follows because we have assumed Rβ=1\Rfree\Discount=1.

5Alternative Formulation

Solution to Exercise 8

Now note that the value function can be rewritten as

vt(kt,mt)=max{it,mt+1}  u((ft+1mt+1)/R+mtitjt)+βvt+1(kt+1,mt+1)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vFunc_{t}(\kap_{t},m_{t}) & = \max_{\{\inv_{t},m_{t+1}\}}~~\utilFunc((f_{t+1}-m_{t+1})/\Rfree+m_{t}-\inv_{t}-\adj_{t}) +\Discount \vFunc_{t+1}(\kap_{t+1},m_{t+1}) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

This holds because maximizing with respect to mt+1m_{t+1} (subject to the accumulation equation) is equivalent to maximizing with respect to the components of mt+1m_{t+1}.

6Investment FOC for Entrepreneur

Solution to Exercise 9

For the version in (26) the FOC with respect to it\inv_{t} is

u(ct)((1+jti)ft+1k/R)=βvt+1k\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \uP(\cRat_{t})((1+\adj_{t}^{\inv})-f_{t+1}^{\kap}\DeprFac/\Rfree)& = \DeprFac\Discount \vNum_{t+1}^{\kap} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Derivation: This holds because the derivative of the RHS of (26) with respect to it\inv_{t} is

u(ct)((ft+1kt+1kt+1it)/Rititjtit)+β(kt+1it)vt+1k(kt+1,mt+1)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \uP(\cRat_{t})\left(\left(\frac{\partial f_{t+1}}{\partial \kap_{t+1}}\frac{\partial \kap_{t+1}}{\partial \inv_{t}}\right)/\Rfree-\frac{\partial \inv_{t}}{\partial \inv_{t}}-\frac{\partial \adj_{t}}{\partial \inv_{t}}\right)+\Discount\left(\frac{\partial \kap_{t+1}}{\partial \inv_{t}}\right)\vFunc^{\kap}_{t+1}(\kap_{t+1},m_{t+1}) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

(remember that mt+1m_{t+1} is a control variable and thus its derivative with respect to investment is zero) so the FOC translates to

u(ct)(ft+1k/R1jti)+βvt+1k=0\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \uP(\cRat_{t})(f_{t+1}^{\kap}\DeprFac/\Rfree-1-\adj_{t}^{\inv})+\Discount\DeprFac \vNum_{t+1}^{\kap}&=0 \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

which reduces to (28).

With taxes: u(ct)(P(1+jti)τft+1k/R)=βvt+1k\uP(\cRat_{t})(\kPriceAfterITC(1+\adj_{t}^{\inv})-\TaxFree f_{t+1}^{\kap}\DeprFac/\Rfree) = \DeprFac\Discount \vNum_{t+1}^{\kap}

7Envelope Theorem for Capital

Solution to Exercise 10

Now we can use the envelope theorem with respect to kt\kap_{t} to show that

vtk=u(ct)(ft+1k/Rjtk)+βvt+1k\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vNum_{t}^{\kap} & = \uP(\cRat_t)(f_{t+1}^{\kap}\DeprFac/\Rfree-\adj_{t}^{\kap})+\Discount \DeprFac \vNum_{t+1}^{\kap} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

This can be seen by directly taking the derivative of the RHS of (26) with respect to kt\kap_{t}:

u(ct)((ft+1kt+1kt+1kt)/Rjtkt)+β(kt+1kt)vt+1k\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \uP(\cRat_{t})\left(\left(\frac{\partial f_{t+1}}{\partial \kap_{t+1}}\frac{\partial \kap_{t+1}}{\partial \kap_{t}}\right)/\Rfree-\frac{\partial \adj_{t}}{\partial \kap_{t}}\right)+ \Discount \left(\frac{\partial \kap_{t+1}}{\partial \kap_{t}}\right) \vNum_{t+1}^{\kap} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

and noting that the Envelope theorem tells us the derivatives with respect to the controls mt+1m_{t+1} and it\inv_{t} are zero while kt+1/kt=\partial \kap_{t+1}/\partial \kap_{t} = \DeprFac.

8Euler Equation for Investment (Entrepreneur)

Solution to Exercise 11

Now we can combine (28) and (32) to derive the Euler equation for investment

(1+jti)=β[fk(kt+1)+(1+jt+1ijt+1k)].\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} (1+\adj_{t}^{\inv}) & = \DeprFac\Discount \left[ \fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t+1})+(1+\adj_{t+1}^{\inv}-\adj_{t+1}^{\kap})\right] . \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

Derivation: To see this, start with the Envelope theorem and substitute from (28),

vtk=u(ct)(ft+1k/Rjtk)+βvt+1k=u(ct)((1+jti)ft+1k/R)=u(ct)(ft+1k/Rjtk)+u(ct)((1+jti)ft+1k/R)=u(ct)(1+jtijtk)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vNum_{t}^{\kap} & = \uP(\cRat_{t})(f_{t+1}^{\kap}\DeprFac/\Rfree-\adj_{t}^{\kap})+\overbrace{\DeprFac \Discount \vNum_{t+1}^{\kap}}^{= \uP(\cRat_{t})((1+\adj_{t}^{\inv})-f_{t+1}^{\kap}\DeprFac /\Rfree)} \\ & = \uP(\cRat_{t})(f_{t+1}^{\kap}\DeprFac/\Rfree-\adj_{t}^{\kap})+\uP(\cRat_{t})((1+\adj_{t}^{\inv})-f_{t+1}^{\kap}\DeprFac /\Rfree) \\ & = \uP(\cRat_{t})\left(1+\adj_{t}^{\inv}-\adj_{t}^{\kap}\right) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

which means that we can rewrite (28) substituting the rolled-forward version:

u(ct)((1+jti)ft+1k/R)=βvt+1k=βu(ct+1)(1+jt+1ijt+1k)(1+jti)=β[fk(kt+1)+(1+jt+1ijt+1k)]\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \uP(\cRat_{t})((1+\adj_{t}^{\inv})-f_{t+1}^{\kap}\DeprFac/\Rfree)& = \DeprFac\Discount \vNum_{t+1}^{\kap} \\ & = \DeprFac\Discount \uP(\cRat_{t+1})\left(1+\adj_{t+1}^{\inv}-\adj_{t+1}^{\kap}\right) \\ (1+\adj_{t}^{\inv}) & = \DeprFac\Discount \left[ \fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t+1})+(1+\adj_{t+1}^{\inv}-\adj_{t+1}^{\kap})\right] \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

where the last line follows because with Rβ=1\Rfree\Discount=1 we know that ct+1=ct\cRat_{t+1}=\cRat_{t} implying u(ct+1)=u(ct)\uP(\cRat_{t+1})=\uP(\cRat_{t}).

With taxes: P(1+jti)=β[τfk(kt+1)+P(1+jt+1ijt+1k)]\kPriceAfterITC (1+\adj_{t}^{\inv}) = \DeprFac\Discount \left[ \TaxFree\fFunc^{\kap}(\kap_{t+1})+\kPriceAfterITC(1+\adj_{t+1}^{\inv}-\adj_{t+1}^{\kap})\right]

9Observational Equivalence

Solution to Exercise 12

Since behavior (for either a firm manager or a consumer) is determined by Euler equations, and the Euler equations for both consumption and investment are identical in this model to the Euler equations for the standard models, there is no observable consequence for investment of the fact that the firm is being run by a utility maximizer, and there is no observable consequence for consumption of the fact that the consumer owns a business enterprise with costly capital adjustment.

10Impulse Responses: Monetary Shock

Now consider a firm of this kind that happens to have arrived in period tt with positive monetary assets mt>0m_{t}>0 and with capital equal to the steady-state target value kt=kˇ\kap_{t}=\check{k}.

Suppose that a thief steals all the firm’s monetary assets.

Solution to Exercise 13

The consequences for the firm are depicted in Figure 2.

Impulse response to a negative shock to m_t (monetary assets stolen).

Figure 2:Impulse response to a negative shock to mtm_t (monetary assets stolen).

Dividends follow a random walk. Thus, there is a one-time downward adjustment to the level of dividends to reflect the stolen money. Thereafter dividends are constant, as are monetary assets (which are constant at zero forever).

The theft of the money has no effect on investment or the capital stock, because the firm’s investment decisions are made on the basis of whether they are profitable and the theft of the money has no effect on the profitability of investments.

11Impulse Responses: Capital Shock

Now consider another kind of shock: The firm’s main building gets hit by a meteor, destroying some of the firm’s capital stock.

Solution to Exercise 14

The results are depicted in Figure 3.

Impulse response to a negative shock to k_t (capital destroyed by meteor).

Figure 3:Impulse response to a negative shock to ktk_t (capital destroyed by meteor).

Again, because dividends follow a random walk, what the firm’s managers do is to assess the effect of the meteor shock on the firm’s total value and they adjust the level of dividends downward immediately to the sustainable new level of dividends. Thereafter there is no change in the level of dividends.

Investment is more complicated. The firm’s capital stock is obviously reduced below its steady-state value by the meteor, so there must be a period of high investment expenditures to bring capital back toward its steady state. However, the firm started out with monetary assets of zero. Therefore the high initial investment expenditures will be paid for by borrowing, driving the firm’s monetary assets to a permanent negative value (the firm goes into debt to pay for its rebuilding). Gradually over time the capital stock is rebuilt back to its target level, and investment expenditures return to zero (or the level consistent with replacing depreciated capital).

12Numerical Solution

The solution code uses the following definitions for the production and adjustment cost functions:[3]

f(k,)=Ψkα1αj(i,k)=ωk2(ikδ)2\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \fFunc(k,\labor)&= \Psi k^\kapShare \labor^{1-\kapShare} \\ \jFunc(i,\kap)&=\frac{\omega k}{2}\left(\frac{i}{k}-\frac{\depr}{\DeprFac}\right)^2 \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

where Ψ\Psi is the firm’s productivity and \labor is the labor supplied by the entrepreneur (assumed equal to 1).

The policy functions are obtained using the method of reverse shooting, which is based on recovering for a given kt+1k_{t+1} and et+1(kt+1)\vFirm_{t+1}(k_{t+1}) the values of ktk_t, iti_t and et(kt)\vFirm_{t}(k_{t}) consistent with the first order conditions and transition equations.

The reverse-shooting equation for capital comes from a combination of the dynamic budget constraint and the Euler equation. For convenience defining

ztkt+1/\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} z_t& \equiv k_{t+1}/\DeprFac \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

so that

it=ztkt,\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} i_{t} = z_{t}-k_{t}, \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

we can rewrite the investment Euler equation as

(1+jti)=β(fk(kt+1)+(1+jt+1ijt+1k))(1+ω(itztktktδ))=β(fk(kt+1)+(1+jt+1ijt+1k))\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} (1+j_{t}^{i}) & = \DeprFac\Discount \left( \fFunc^{k}(k_{t+1})+(1+j_{t+1}^{i}-j_{t+1}^{k})\right)\\ \left(1+\omega\left(\frac{\overbrace{i_t}^{z_{t}-k_{t}}}{k_t}-\frac{\depr}{\DeprFac}\right)\right) & = \DeprFac\Discount \left( \fFunc^{k}(k_{t+1})+(1+j_{t+1}^{i}-j_{t+1}^{k})\right) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

so that

ztkt1=β(fk(kt+1)+(1+jt+1ijt+1k))/ω1/ω+δ/kt=ztβ(fk(kt+1)+(1+jt+1ijt+1k))/ω1/ω+δ/+1.\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \frac{z_t}{k_t}-1 & =\DeprFac\Discount\left( \fFunc^{k}(k_{t+1})+(1+j_{t+1}^{i}-j_{t+1}^{k})\right)/\omega-1/\omega+\depr/\DeprFac\\ k_t&=\frac{z_t}{\DeprFac\Discount\left( \fFunc^{k}(k_{t+1})+(1+j_{t+1}^{i}-j_{t+1}^{k})\right)/\omega-1/\omega+\depr/\DeprFac+1}. \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

With the values of iti_{t} and jtj_{t} obtained from these reverse-shooting equations, the reverse-shooting equation for value is very simple: It is the Bellman equation

et(kt)=ftitjt+et+1(kt+1)/R,\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \vFirm_{t}(k_{t})&=f_{t}-i_{t}-j_{t}+\vFirm_{t+1}(k_{t+1})/\Rfree, \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

where note that ftf_{t} and itjti_{t}-j_{t} are direct functions of ktk_{t} and iti_{t} which we have already computed.

The steady-state level of capital can be obtained from (11):

R/1=fk(kˇ)1α(R/1)=kˇα1(1α(R/1))1/(α1)=kˇ\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \Rfree/\DeprFac -1 & = \fFunc^{k}(\check{k}) \\ \frac{1}{\alpha} \left(\Rfree/\DeprFac -1\right) & = \check{k}^{\kapShare-1} \\ \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \left(\Rfree/\DeprFac -1\right)\right)^{1/(\kapShare-1)} & = \check{k} \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

while the steady-state value of λ\ek comes from substituting kˇ\check{\kap} into (14). Steady-state value is straightforward to compute, given that in the steady state the capital stock and amount of investment are constant:

eˇ=n=0(f(kˇ)iˇ)βn=(R/r)(f(kˇ)iˇ).\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \check{\vFirm} & = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} (\fFunc(\check{\kap})-\check{i})\Discount^{n} \\ & = (\Rfree/\rfree)(\fFunc(\check{\kap}) - \check{i}). \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

The reverse shooting routine starts its backwards iterations from a kt^k_{\hat{t}} level very close to the steady state of the model and, as discussed in the methodological appendix to the TractableBufferStock section, the accuracy of the solution is improved if we approximate it^i_{\hat{t}} with a first order Taylor expansion using the derivative of investment at the steady state:

it^=iˇ+iˇkϵ\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} i_{\hat{t}}&=\check{i}+\check{i}^k\epsilon \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

where the  ˇ\check{~} identifies variables at the steady state and ϵ\epsilon is the deviation from the steady state. iˇk\check{i}^k is computed by differentiating the Euler equation with respect to k\kap:

(jtiiitk+jtik)=β(ft^kk(1+itk)+(jt^ik(1+itk)+jt^iiit^kjt^kk(1+itk)jt^kiit^k))\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} (j^{ii}_t i^k_t+j^{ik}_t) = \DeprFac\Discount\left(f^{kk}_{\hat{t}}\DeprFac(1+i^k_t)+(j^{ik}_{\hat{t}}\DeprFac(1+i^k_t)+j^{ii}_{\hat{t}}i^k_{\hat{t}} -j^{kk}_{\hat{t}}\DeprFac(1+i^k_t)-j^{ki}_{\hat{t}}i^k_{\hat{t}})\right) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

which at the steady-state where it^k=itk=iˇki^{k}_{\hat{t}}=i^{k}_{t}=\check{i}^{k} becomes:

(jtiiiˇk+jtik)=β(ft^kk(1+iˇk)+(jt^ik(1+iˇk)+jt^iiiˇkjt^kk(1+iˇk)jt^kiiˇk))\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} (j^{ii}_t \check{i}^k+j^{ik}_t)=\DeprFac\Discount\left(f^{kk}_{\hat{t}}\DeprFac(1+\check{i}^k)+(j^{ik}_{\hat{t}}\DeprFac(1+\check{i}^k)+j^{ii}_{\hat{t}}\check{i}^k-j^{kk}_{\hat{t}}\DeprFac(1+\check{i}^k) -j^{ki}_{\hat{t}}\check{i}^k)\right) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

and given any particular set of parameter values iˇk\check{i}^k can be found using standard numerical rootfinding methods.

Finally since the problem is solved under perfect foresight the entrepreneur’s consumption function is simply:

ct=(R(Rβ)1/ρR)(mt+et(kt)ft)\begin{gathered}\begin{aligned} \cons_t=\left(\frac{\Rfree-(\Rfree\Discount)^{1/\CRRA}}{\Rfree}\right)(m_t+\vFirm_{t}(k_{t})-f_t) \end{aligned}\end{gathered}

because this corresponds to the solution to a perfect foresight consumption problem in which the consumer has monetary resources mtm_{t} and net nonmonetary financial resources et(kt)ft\vFirm_{t}(k_{t})-f_t (see the Consumption Under Perfect Foresight and CRRA Utility).

Footnotes
  1. The model can include corporate taxes. With taxes, additional parameters are: τ\TaxCorp (tax rate on corporate earnings), τ=1τ\TaxFree = 1-\TaxCorp (portion of earnings untaxed), πt=f(kt)τ\rev_{t} = \fFunc(\kap_{t})\TaxFree (after tax revenues), ζ\itc (investment tax credit), P=ζ=1ζ\kPriceAfterITC=\PostITC = 1-\itc (cost of 1 unit of investment after ITC), and ξt=(it+jt)P\xpend_{t} = (\inv_{t}+\adj_{t})\kPriceAfterITC (after-tax expenditures on investment).

  2. There are some small differences between the formulation of the model here and in the The Abel (1981)-Hayashi (1982) Marginal q Model. Here, investment costs are paid at the time of investment and the depreciation factor applies to (kt+it)(\kap_{t}+\inv_{t}) rather than just kt\kap_{t}. These changes simplify the computational solution without changing any key results.

  3. The slight modification to the cost-of-adjustment function (relative to the formulation in the The Abel (1981)-Hayashi (1982) Marginal q Model) reflects the changed timing of depreciation in (2) compared to the corresponding equation in qModel. In the continuous-time limit the two equations become the same, but the formulation here makes the representation of the problem slightly more transparent in the discrete-time computer code. The code also includes the parameters P\kPriceAfterITC and τ\TaxFree (respectively the investment cost after the Investment Tax Credit and the untaxed portion of earnings) in order to study the impact of tax policies. Both parameters are however assumed equal to 1 and thus the equations in the code are equivalent to the simpler ones described in this section.