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The Equity Premium Puzzle and the Riskfree Rate

Authors
Affiliations
Johns Hopkins University
Econ-ARK
Johns Hopkins University
Econ-ARK

This section derives the equity premium puzzle (Mehra & Prescott (1985)). Consider a representative agent solving the joint consumption and portfolio allocation problem:

v(mt)=max{ct,ςt} u(ct)+Et[n=1βnu(ct+n)]s.t.mt+1=(mtct)R~t+1+yt+1R~t+1=ςtRt+1+(1ςt)R\begin{aligned} \vFunc(m_{t}) & = \max_{\{c_{t},\riskyshare_{t}\}} ~\uFunc(c_{t}) + \Ex_{t}\left[\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \Discount^{n} \uFunc(c_{t+n}) \right] \\ & \text{s.t.} \\ m_{t+1} & = (m_{t}-c_{t})\Rport_{t+1} + y_{t+1} \\ \Rport_{t+1} & = \riskyshare_{t}\Risky_{t+1}+(1-\riskyshare_{t})\Rfree \end{aligned}

where R\Rfree denotes the return on a perfectly riskless asset and Rt+1\Risky_{t+1} denotes the return on equities (the risky asset) held between periods tt and t+1t+1, ςt\riskyshare_{t} is the share of end-of-period savings invested in the risky asset, R~t+1\Rport_{t+1} is the portfolio-weighted rate of return, and yt+1y_{t+1} is noncapital income in period t+1t+1.

As usual, the objective can be rewritten in recursive form:

v(mt)=max{ct,ςt} u(ct)+βEt[v([ςtRt+1+(1ςt)R]R~t+1(mtct)+yt+1)]\vFunc(m_{t}) = \max_{\{c_{t},\riskyshare_{t}\}} ~\uFunc(c_{t}) +\beta \Ex_{t}\left[\vFunc\left(\underbrace{[\riskyshare_{t}\Risky_{t+1}+(1-\riskyshare_{t})\Rfree]}_{{\Rport}_{t+1}}(m_{t}-c_{t})+{y}_{t+1}\right)\right]

The first order condition with respect to ctc_{t} is

u(ct)=βEt[R~t+1v(mt+1)]\uFunc^{\prime}(c_{t}) = \beta \Ex_{t}[ \Rport_{t+1}\vFunc^{\prime}({m}_{t+1})]

and the FOC with respect to ςt\riskyshare_{t} is

Et[(Rt+1R)v(mt+1)(mtct)]=0Et[(Rt+1R)v(mt+1)]=0\begin{aligned} \Ex_{t}[(\Risky_{t+1}-\Rfree)\vFunc^{\prime}({m}_{t+1})({m}_{t}-{c}_{t})] & = 0 \\ \Ex_{t}[(\Risky_{t+1}-\Rfree)\vFunc^{\prime}({m}_{t+1})] & = 0 \end{aligned}

But the usual logic of the The Envelope Theorem and the Euler Equation theorem tells us that

u(ct+1)=v(mt+1)\uFunc^{\prime}(c_{t+1}) = \vFunc^{\prime}(m_{t+1})

so, substituting (5) into (3) and (4) we have

u(ct)=Et[βR~t+1u(ct+1)]Et[(Rt+1R)u(ct+1)]=0\begin{aligned} \uFunc^{\prime}(c_{t}) & = \Ex_{t}\left[\beta \Rport_{t+1} \uFunc^{\prime}({c}_{t+1})\right] \\ \Ex_{t}[(\Risky_{t+1}-\Rfree)\uFunc^{\prime}({c}_{t+1})] & = 0 \end{aligned}

Now assume CRRA utility, u(c)=c1ρ/(1ρ)\uFunc(c) = c^{1-\CRRA}/(1-\CRRA) and divide both sides by ctρc_{t}^{-\CRRA} to get

Et[(ct+1/ct)ρ(Rt+1R)]=0\Ex_{t}[(c_{t+1}/c_{t})^{-\CRRA}(\Risky_{t+1}-\Rfree)] = 0

Now recall the following two facts:

Fact 1: If Δct+1/ct\Delta c_{t+1}/c_{t} is small, ct+1/ct1+Δlogct+1c_{t+1}/c_{t} \approx 1+ \Delta \log c_{t+1}.

Fact 2: If zz is small, (1+z)λ1+λz(1+z)^{\lambda} \approx 1 + \lambda z.

Using these two facts, equation (7) can be approximated by

Et[(1ρΔlogct+1)(Rt+1R)]0\Ex_{t}[(1-\CRRA \Delta \log {c}_{t+1})(\Risky_{t+1}-\Rfree)] \approx 0

Using one more fact,

Fact 3: E[xy]=E[x]E[y]+cov(x,y)\Ex [xy] = \Ex [x]\Ex [y] + \text{cov}(x,y)

we get

(1ρEt[Δlogct+1])(REt[Rt+1])+covt(ρΔlogct+1,Rt+1)0(1-\CRRA \Ex_{t}[\Delta \log {c}_{t+1}])(\Rfree - \Ex_{t}[\Risky_{t+1}])+\text{cov}_{t}(-\CRRA \Delta \log {c}_{t+1},-\Risky_{t+1}) \approx 0

or

Et[Rt+1]Rρcovt(Δlogct+1,Rt+1)1ρEt[Δlogct+1]ρcovt(Δlogct+1,Rt+1)\begin{aligned} \Ex_{t}[\Risky_{t+1}]-\Rfree & \approx \frac{\CRRA \text{cov}_{t}(\Delta \log {c}_{t+1},\Risky_{t+1})}{1-\CRRA \Ex_{t}[ \Delta \log {c}_{t+1}]} \\ & \approx \CRRA \text{cov}_{t}(\Delta \log {c}_{t+1},\Risky_{t+1}) \end{aligned}

where the last approximation holds because Et[Δlogct+1]\Ex_{t}[\Delta \log {c}_{t+1}] is small.

1The Equity Premium Puzzle

Because this expression must hold at all tt, we can check it empirically by calculating empirical estimates of the two components and assuming that the sample averages correspond to the representative agent’s expectations. That is, if we have data for periods 1n1 \ldots n, we assume that the unconditional expectations correspond to the sample means, E[R]=(1/n)s=1nRs\Ex [\Risky] = (1/n) \sum_{s=1}^{n} \Risky_{s}; E[Δlogc]=(1/n)s=1nΔlogcs\Ex [\Delta \log c] = (1/n) \sum_{s=1}^{n} \Delta \log c_{s}; and cov(Δlogc,R)=(1/n)s=1n(ΔlogcsE[Δlogc])(RsE[R])\text{cov}(\Delta \log c,\Risky) = (1/n) \sum_{s=1}^{n} (\Delta \log c_{s} - \Ex [\Delta \log c])(\Risky_{s}-\Ex [\Risky]).

The equity premium puzzle is essentially that cov(Δlogc,R)\text{cov}(\Delta \log c,\Risky) is very small (about 0.004) but E[R]R\Ex [\Risky]-\Rfree is about 0.08 (stocks have earned real returns of about 8 percent more than riskless assets over the historical period), which means that the only way equation (10) can hold is if ρ\CRRA is implausibly large (these values imply a value of ρ=20\CRRA=20).

How do we know what plausible values of ρ\CRRA are? Consider the following. You must choose between a gamble in which you consume $50,000 for the rest of your life with probability 0.5 and $100,000 with probability 0.5, or consuming some amount XX with certainty. The coefficient of relative risk aversion determines the XX which would make you indifferent between consuming X or being exposed to the gamble. For example, if ρ=0\CRRA = 0, then you have no risk aversion at all and you will be indifferent between $75,000 with certainty and the 50/50 gamble with expected value of $75,000. Here are the values of X associated with different values of ρ\CRRA (table taken from Mankiw & Zeldes (1991)).

Table 1:Certainty Equivalent Values for Different Risk Aversion Coefficients

ρ\CRRA

XX

1

70,711

3

63,246

5

58,565

10

53,991

20

51,858

30

51,209

\infty

50,000

2The Riskfree Rate Puzzle

Rewrite the consumption Euler equation (6) as

u(ct)=Et[β(R+ςt[Rt+1R])u(ct+1)]\uFunc^{\prime}(c_{t}) = \Ex_{t}\left[\beta (\Rfree + \riskyshare_{t} [\Risky_{t+1} - \Rfree])\uFunc^{\prime}({c}_{t+1})\right]

and note that from (7) we know that Et[βςt(Rt+1R)u(ct+1)]=0\Ex_{t}[\beta \riskyshare_{t}(\Risky_{t+1}-\Rfree)\uFunc^{\prime}({c}_{t+1})] = 0 so that (11) reduces to the ordinary Euler equation

u(ct)=Et[βRu(ct+1)]1=βREt[(ct+1/ct)ρ]\begin{aligned} \uFunc^{\prime}(c_{t}) & = \Ex_{t}[\beta \Rfree \uFunc^{\prime}({c}_{t+1})] \\ 1 & = \beta \Rfree \Ex_{t}[ ({c}_{t+1}/c_{t})^{-\CRRA}] \end{aligned}

Using the same “facts” and approximations as above, we get the standard approximation to the Euler equation,

Δlogct+1(1/ρ)(rϑ)\Delta \log c_{t+1} \approx (1/\CRRA) (\rfree - \timeRate)

The “riskfree rate puzzle” is that average consumption growth per capita has been about 1.5 percent (in the US in the postwar period) while real riskfree interest rates have been at most 1 percent. Even if we assume a time preference rate of ϑ=0\timeRate=0 (no impatience at all, e.g. β=1\beta=1), the only way this equation can hold is if ρ\CRRA is a very small number (maybe even less than one). Of course, this is precisely the opposite of the conclusion of the equity premium puzzle, which implies the ρ\CRRA must be very large.

In principle, the riskfree rate puzzle might be explicable by overlapping generations models, though in practice it has proven difficult to make this mechanism work quantitatively. A precautionary saving motive can also help reduce the puzzle by adding a variance term to consumption growth, which would allow the Euler equation to hold even with low riskfree rates.

References
  1. Mehra, R., & Prescott, E. C. (1985). The Equity Premium: A Puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics, 15(2), 145–161. 10.1016/0304-3932(85)90061-3
  2. Mankiw, N. G., & Zeldes, S. P. (1991). The Consumption of Stockholders and Nonstockholders. Journal of Financial Economics, 29(1), 97–112. 10.1016/0304-405X(91)90015-C